Economic Development

  • iraqieconomy.org

    A non-profit website with information on the Iraqi economy. Reguarly updated with relevant news articles and press releases.

  • New GAO testimony on 'Rebuilding Iraq', 28 Sept 2006 (26 Sept 2006)

    New congressional testimony by the US federal oversight body, the Government Accountability Office, on the progress of US-funded reconstruction efforts. Reports that (as of August 2006):

    • crude oil production is lower than pre-war levels (2.4 million barrels per day (mbpd), compared to the prewar level of 2.6 mbpd)
    • electricity generation was at 4,855 megawatts, above the prewar level of 4,300 megawatts, but below the US goal of 6,000 megawatts.
    • treated water delivery stands at 1.44 million cubic meters per day, compared to the U.S. goal of 2.4 million cubic meters.

    Violence and conflict is blamed for much of this shortfall. But within this uncertain context the GAO found that the US Department of Defense risked inflating the costs and delays of reconstruction further by

    • awarding some reconstruction contracts without defining "the work to be performed and its projected costs"
    • lacking the necessary personnel to administrate contracts
    • circumventing competition rules on awarding contracts by simply adding new, unrelated work to existing contracts (for instance, contracting for translators under an environmental services contract)
  • Development Gateway: Relief and Reconstruction in Iraq

    An excellent collection of links and documents, including "Iraq's Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future"; "Gender and Constitution-Building: From Paper to Practice"; and "The Iraqi Constitution from an Economic Perspective"

  • Economic Policy
    • Statement on EU Trade (20 Nov 2006)

      Report in the Financial Times newspaper on a bilateral trade deal with the EU

    • A Joint Statement Concerning the Programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Iraq (16 Jan 2006)

      This joint statement of workers unions from all parts of Iraq was adopted on January the 16th, 2006, at the end of a two-day seminar in Amman, Jordan.

    • IMF Approves Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq (23 Dec 2005)

      The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the institution's first-ever Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq, which is designed to support the nation's economic program over the next 15 months. A pdf file containing a report by IMF staff completed endorsing the SBA request, an Appendix containing documents from the Iraqi government in support of their SBA request, a supplemental report by IMF staff indicating that Iraq had enacted the remaining pre-conditions to the SBA, and a statement by Iraq's Executive Director at the IMF is now available. The main elements of the reports are:

      • the SBA allows Iraq to draw on 40% of its IMF quota in the event of a crisis; Iraqi authorities plan not to use this right;

      • the SBA runs until March 2007

      • in return for this facility, Iraq accepts a number of quantitative performance criteria and targets (p. 29, Table 11) centred on fiscal stability as well as a number of qualitative structural performance criteria and benchmarks (p. 31, Table 13) centred on central bank operations, government statistics (including audits thereof) and the development of the banking sector, largely by implementing modern clearing systems between the CBI and commercial banks.

      • approval of the SBA triggers the second 30% reduction of Paris Club debt. The IMF staff still regard Iraqi debt as 'unsustainable'; with the third reduction (to occur if Iraq undergoes three years of programmes like the SBA) it becomes 'sustainable'

      • the document reports on Iraqi economic and governance performance

      None of the ongoing criteria or targets listed above relate directly to petroleum product subsidies. That which seems to bear on this most closely is the floor on revenues from oil related enterprises (Table 11). This would see ID3,250bn (US$2.2bn) raised over 2006, compared to ID900bn (US$600mn) over 2005. To put this in perspective, the 2006 target is a bit less than what the Iraqi government has been spending annually to import refined products.

      In December 2005, as a 'prior action', the Iraqi government did reduce subsidies on a number of petroleum products. The price schedule is displayed in Table 6 (p. 24), which includes an average of prices in the Gulf. These are listed as the IMF staff "urge" Iraq (p. 10, para. 21) to align domestic prices to this average by 2007; the strategy of Iraqi authorities is to further increase prices on a quarterly basis.

      There is almost no discussion about how these prices rises are expected to influence Iraqi society: no information is presented on who currently benefits from the subsidies, in part as this is probably not known - a household income and expenditure survey is only expected to be ready by the end of 2006 (p. 15, para. 39). Thus, steps are mentioned to offset the disruption that will be caused - better control over ration expenses, a 'safety net' equal to one third the savings gained from subsidy reductions targetted at the million poorest households (p. 11, para. 25) - but no further details are provided.

    • 2005 Article IV Consultation (Aug 2005)

      Annual IMF report, including data on oil production, inflation, assesment of Millenium Development Goals progress. Notes a lack of macroeconomic data and urges the Iraqi government to reduce Petrol subsidies. There is also a statistical appendix

    • Pensions In Iraq: Issues, General Guidelines for Reform and Potential Fiscal Implications (Aug 2005)

      World Bank policy note

    • Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (July 2005)

      Executive Summary of a report focusing on the main issues of Iraq’s transition . Lays out policy options available to the Iraqi government, and discussing tradeoffs under each option. The key themes are reconstruction and job creation; reform of the pricing system; managing oil revenues; and strengthening safety nets.

      In particular, notes "In 2004, only 15 percent of households had a stable electricity supply, and a mere 20 percent had safe and stable drinking water. ". Also focuses on the need to create a better environment for private job creation, trade policy, pricing systems and public governance.

    • Iraq Development Strategy: 2005-2007 (30 June 2005)

      Produced by the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. Comprehensive look at government strategy at the micro and macro level, including a focus on how to devolve responsibilities to the regional level.

    • Considering the Future of the Iraqi Public Distribution System (28 June 2005)

      Looks at the function of the PDS in the post-sanctions-era. Considers three options: a rapid elimination of the PDS; replacement of the PDS with universal cash transfers (available to all Iraqis); and replacement of the PDS with means-tested cash transfers. It recommends a four-part program including (i) gradually introducing targeting, (ii) reducing the number of products in the ration basket, (iii) increasing the role and capacity of the private sector in the PDS, and in food markets in general, and (iv) immediate improvements in procurement and financial management.

    • Baghdad Year Zero (Sept 2004)

      Naomi Klein links the failures in reconstruction of Iraq to US corporate interests and laissez-faire economic policy.

    • Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Iraq (19 May 2004)

      Paper by Almas Heshmati, an academic at the MTT Agrifood Research Finland. Tries to provide a comprehensive picture of the past and current conditions in Iraq, and evaluates proposed development policies

    • Economic policy and prospects in Iraq (04 May 2004)

      Account of the CPA's attempts at economic reform. Concludes that economic development will come only if Iraq "maintains the pro-market outlook of Coalition policy". Written by four former CPA officials, affiliated with the US treasury, US and UK central banks, and the RAND Corporation. Draft of a paper written for the Journal of Economic Perspectives.

    • Joseph Stiglitz discusses the dangers of liberalization in Iraq (23 Sept 2003)

      Video of a speech by Joseph Stiglitz (winner of the 2001 Nobel prize for economics) criticizing rapid liberalisation of the Iraqi economy. With responses from two other academics.

    • Iraq's economy: past, present, future (03 June 2003)

      Report prepared for the US Senate committee on foreign relations by Jonathan E. Sanford. Although this version dates to 2003, the report claims it "will be updated periodically".

    • Accession through the backdoor: how the US is pushing Iraq into the WTO

      Mary Lou Malig looks into US workings on Iraq's acession to the WTO in an article for 'Focus on the Global South' .

  • Reconstruction
    • UNAMI Reconstruction and Development updates

      Index of monthly updates since April 2005 produced by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq.

    • GAO report: Coalition Support and International Donor Commitments (May 2007) (09 May 2007)

      US Government Accountability Office statement on foreign troop levels and international donor commitments to Iraq's reconstruction.

      On the latter, it found that:

      • As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about $14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion.

      • About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans (mainly from the IMF, World Bank, Japan and Iran), with the remaining $4.6 billion in the form of grants.

      • As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed only about $436 million in loans from the IMF, and had received $3 billion in grants, suggesting considerable wariness on the part of the Iraqi government to contract new debt: "according to the State Department, the Iraqis lack a system for approving projects supported by donor loans, which has impeded efforts by the World Bank and Japan to initiate loan-based projects."

      • According to IMF reporting as of February 2007, Iraq has received about $39 billion in debt reduction from commercial and bilateral creditors.

      • The UK has provided bilateral grants to Iraq totalling $775 million (i.e. outside the projects funded by UN and World Bank trust funds for Iraq)

    • Article on Iraq Electricity (06 Nov 2006)

      Review in the Middle East Economic Survey on whether Iraq's 10 year plan for electricity is credible

    • New GAO testimony on 'Rebuilding Iraq', 28 Sept 2006 (26 Sept 2006)

      New congressional testimony by the US federal oversight body, the Government Accountability Office, on the progress of US-funded reconstruction efforts. Reports that (as of August 2006):

      • crude oil production is lower than pre-war levels (2.4 million barrels per day (mbpd), compared to the prewar level of 2.6 mbpd)
      • electricity generation was at 4,855 megawatts, above the prewar level of 4,300 megawatts, but below the US goal of 6,000 megawatts.
      • treated water delivery stands at 1.44 million cubic meters per day, compared to the U.S. goal of 2.4 million cubic meters.

      Violence and conflict is blamed for much of this shortfall. But within this uncertain context the GAO found that the US Department of Defense risked inflating the costs and delays of reconstruction further by

      • awarding some reconstruction contracts without defining "the work to be performed and its projected costs"
      • lacking the necessary personnel to administrate contracts
      • circumventing competition rules on awarding contracts by simply adding new, unrelated work to existing contracts (for instance, contracting for translators under an environmental services contract)
    • CSIS Report: Iraqi Economic Reconstruction and Development (21 Apr 2006)

      A CSIS report by Onur Ozlu puts Iraq's economic reconstruction in broad historical perspective and then provides a sector-by-sector analysis of what is happening in Iraq and the successes and failures of the aid process.

      The US aid effort in Iraq has not accomplished most of its sectoral goals, and more importantly, has not effectively initiated the reconstruction of the country’s economy. After three years of struggle, the expenditure of more than $ 20 billion US aid funds, $ 37 billion Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) - UN accumulated from the oil for food program’s revenues and the seizure of bank accounts- and death of thousands of US and other coalition soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqis, Iraq is producing less oil, has less electricity and less water than it did during the Saddam period. After studying the modern Iraqi economic history as a background, this work analyzes why.

      Insurgency has been a major obstacle to an effective econstruction. However, shortcomings of the US aid planning and execution indicate that even if there was not an endemic insurgency in Iraq, the reconstruction would still be ineffective.

    • Fact Sheet on Aid from Japan (17 Apr 2006)
    • Corporate Watch report: 'UK Companies in Iraq' (13 March 2006)

      "This report analyses the role of UK corporations in post-Saddam Iraq. To date, we have uncovered evidence for about £1.1bn worth of contracts, from the US and UK reconstruction budget, and from the Iraqi ministries."

      "UK corporations are playing a key role in two sectors: consulting (especially privatisation support) and private security, including private military companies. See the sections ‘Consultants: creating a new Iraq’ and ‘Bodies of armed men’ for more on these areas. The UK government, and British-based trade associations, have also played a key role in facilitating corporate access to Iraq’s markets, services and resources; see section ‘Iraq wasn’t sold in a day.’"

      Press coverage (AFP): “British firms enjoy billion-pound Iraq war dividend”

      LONDON (AFP) - British businesses have profited by at least 1.1 billion pounds (1.9 billion dollars) since coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein three years ago, The Independent newspaper reported.

    • Corporate Watch report: 'UK Companies in Iraq' (13 March 2006)

      "This report analyses the role of UK corporations in post-Saddam Iraq. To date, we have uncovered evidence for about £1.1bn worth of contracts, from the US and UK reconstruction budget, and from the Iraqi ministries."

      "UK corporations are playing a key role in two sectors: consulting (especially privatisation support) and private security, including private military companies. See the sections ‘Consultants: creating a new Iraq’ and ‘Bodies of armed men’ for more on these areas. The UK government, and British-based trade associations, have also played a key role in facilitating corporate access to Iraq’s markets, services and resources; see section ‘Iraq wasn’t sold in a day.’"

      Press coverage (AFP): “British firms enjoy billion-pound Iraq war dividend”

      LONDON (AFP) - British businesses have profited by at least 1.1 billion pounds (1.9 billion dollars) since coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein three years ago, The Independent newspaper reported.

    • Transcript of US State Department briefing on budget support (28 Feb 2006)

      Briefing given by James F. Jeffrey, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, on Assistance to Iraq in the FY 2006 Supplemental Budget and FY 2007 Budget Request.

    • Iraq Reconstruction: Without Additional Funding, Progress Likely to Fall Short, Weakening War Effort (27 Feb 2006)

      Report from the Centre for Strategic and Budgetry Assesments, detailing the need for between $18bn-$28bn more needed to complete the reconstruction of Iraq, an amount far greater than the $2.2bn the US has pledged.

    • GAO Testimony: Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Financing Challenges (08 Feb 2006)

      "Iraq will likely need more than the $56 billion that the World Bank, United Nations, and CPA estimated it would require for reconstruction and stabilization efforts from 2004 to 2007."

      "However, it is unclear how Iraq will finance these additional requirements....Iraq's ability to financially contribute to its own rebuilding and stabilization efforts will depend on the new government's efforts to increase revenues obtained from crude oil exports, reduce energy and food subsidies, control government operating expenses, provide for a growing security force, and repay $84 billion in external debt and war reparations." Summary is here

    • Latest SIGIR Testimonies (08 Feb 2006)

      Testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction, and testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support on contracting issues. Also included is a reconstruction fact sheet.

      In particular, notes the striking fall in the perfomance of Iraqi utilities since the pre-war period, despite massive US investment, with virtually all indicators being lower than before the fall of Saddam. A summary can be found in the New York Times, while more information can be found in the SIGIR section.

    • "Re-engineering Iraq" (Feb 2006)

      Article by Glenn Zorpette in Spectrum, a publication by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

      This seeks to answer, from an engineering perspective, why Iraq still has a large generation shortfall and to provide a picture of the reconstruction effort.

      The article identifies as the "fundamental reasons" for the failure of electricity system reconstruction in Iraq:

      • A poor match between generating technologies and the kinds of fuels available in Iraq.
      • A well-armed insurgency that has made destroying electrical infrastructure a centerpiece of its bid to destroy the country's fledgling democracy.
      • Revenue levels coming into the Ministry of Electricity that are so low as to be insignificant [...]
      • Management and personnel problems at all levels of the government, including the ministry [...]
      • The erosion of operational and, particularly, maintenance skills among workers at the country's Ministry of Electricity.

      The detailed account of the problems at the Quds power plant give a particularly stark account of the combination of incompetence, lack of funds, poor communication, poor security, and discontinuity in personnel that has led to highly efficient power turbines not being run.

      The article includes a map of the Iraqi generation and transmission system.

    • Latest SIGIR Audit Reports (26 Jan 2006)

      On the 26th January, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released a report entitled The Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects. Just prior to this, on the 23rd January, four others were released, including reports on the Rapid Regional Response Programs in South-Central Iraq, the transfer of IRRF funded assests to the Iraqi government, the managemnet of the Commaders Response Program, and the Mansuria Electrical Reconstuction Project

      The report on the IRRF projects looks at the scope and effect of the 'reconstruction gap' - the difference between the number of projects that the US originally proposed to build, and the total built. Findings included that only 49 out of a proposed 136 projects in the water and sanitation. The main explanation was a massive increase in security costs (a reallocation of $5.6bn from the original $18.4bn). A summary can be found in the New York Times

      The investigation into the management by the CPA of the Rapid Regional Response Programs, total value about $88million, discovers a massive amount of overcharging, manipulation to avoid review, unauthorised payments, and a severe lack of appropriate acounting and documentation. The report recommends that money wasted through over-payments should be recovered. It also containst stories of millions of reconstruction dollars stuffed casually into footlockers and filing cabinets, an American soldier in the Philippines who gambled away cash belonging to Iraq, and three Iraqis who plunged to their deaths in a rebuilt hospital elevator that had been improperly certified as safe. Moreover, it reports that there were no detailed, overt preparations for the reconstruction of Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 invasion "to avoid the impression that the US government had already decided on [military] intervention". A brief review can be found in the New York Times

      The report on the asset transfers looks at the transfer of the projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and managed by the US (namely the Gulf Region Division (GRD) or the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Project Contracting Office (PCO)), to the Iraqi government in 2006-2007. Notes that while procedures for transfer on a local level are fairly well set out, there is a lack of central policy and procedure for transferral of information to the central Iraqi ministires. The report also puts a figure on the 'reconstruction gap'

      The Commanders Response Program used $718million for militrary commanders to respond to local urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements. The audit found a lack of co-ordination, and errors in the monitoring of how funds were spent. The Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project reportlooked into an abadoned project to build a power station by USAID and IRRF, with a total estimated cost of about $70million.

    • US Plans to Stop Funding Iraq Reconstruction (02 Jan 2006)

      Article in the Washington Post detailing reports from government officials saying that the Bush administration does not intend to seek any extra funds from Congress after the $18.4bn already allocated runs out. "The U.S. never intended to completely rebuild Iraq," Brig. Gen. William McCoy, the Army Corps of Engineers commander overseeing the work, told reporters at a recent news conference.

    • Second Sixth-Month Report of the activities of UNDG ITF (30 Nov 2005)

      This report is in two parts, with part two containting cluster level progress reports, and part one covering progress as a whole. The report covers Jan-July 2005, detailing the work of the fund. It concludes by noting that though project implimentation is speeding up, extra funds will be needed.

    • The Bush Administration Record: The Reconstruction of Iraq (18 Oct 2005)

      Report prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman by the Committee On Government Reform, Minority Office. States "Billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent, but there is little to show for the expenditures in Iraq", concluding there are two major causes of this - the lack of security, and the flawed contracting systems used. Also notes massive over-charging by Haliburton for work on the Oil Sector, an inability of the Iraqi ministries to maintain projects started by USAID due to inadequate training, and a complete lack of improvement on providing drinkable water to Iraqis.

    • US GAO Testimony: 'Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results And Mantaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress' (18 Oct 2005)

      Report by the US Government Accountability Office investigating US progress in rebuilding Iraq. Notes the difficulting in maintaining infrastructure projects, and the difficulty of measuring progress. Recommends that Iraq will probably need signifcantly more than the $56bn estimated previously by the World Bank, due to unforseen looting, sabotage and lower than expected oil revenues. Finds that data collected is incomplete, citing for example that the Department of State reports on number of water projects completed, but not on the condition of the water supply to Iraqi people. A summary can be found here.

    • Blood, sweat and tears: Asia's poor build US bases in Iraq (03 Oct 2005)

      Corpwatch investigation into the mistreatment of 'third country nationals' employed in Iraq by private contractors and the American military. These workers, mainly from Asian countries such as the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, are underpaid, overworked (some report 84-hour weeks), and given inadequate protection. Alongside them American workers are paid many times more, and have massively better living conditions.

    • Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn? (Oct 2005)

      Review of the planning process within the CPA and related bodies, conducted by the RAND corporation. This concentrates primarily on management and institutional organisation, rather than on the problems and successes of policies.

    • Accelerating economic progress in Iraq (20 July 2005)

      Senate hearing, considering four questions:

      1. Should the Coalition shift more economic resources from Baghdad to the provinces?
      2. Should they increase resources and emphasis on creating jobs?
      3. Should they devote more effort to preventing corruption and sabotage in the oil industry?
      4. Should they create a reliable set of indicators for economic progress?

      Witnesses were Keith Crane (RAND), Fareed Mohamedi (PFC Energy), and Frederick D. Barton (CSIS)

      Crane suggests that the focus should be on the central ministries (since at this time the Iraq government's mechanisms for working in the provinces are weak and unproven), and that poverty is a problem over unemployment, sincly many of the large unemployment figures are exagerated. Reckons the time for high profile large projects has passed. States the largest form of corruption is the theft of fuel by government officials. Strongly recommends a transparent periodic liberalization of the price of gasoline, and that the gathering and processing of statistics should be done through the Iraqi ministries, not by the coalition directly. Mohamedi notes problems with electriciity supplies being regionalised to support the assertion that assistance should be done at a national, not regional, level - similarly for control of oil production and revenue. Suggests sabotage is a bigger problem than corruption for the oil sector in the short term, though not in the long term. Barton advocates a move away from the ineffective ministries, microfinance over work programs, and cash transfers to replace the food distribution program.

    • The World Bank In Iraq: Iraqi Ownership for Sustainability (June 2005)

      Working paper looking at how the bank should go about reconstruction porjects and institution building in Iraq, looking at previous World Bank work and the background of Iraq.

    • Estimated Breakdown of Funding Flows for Iraq’s Reconstruction: How Are The Funds Being Spent? (Dec 2004)

      Pie chart breakdwon of how the reconstruction funds for iraq are being spent, prepared by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, part of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Estimates 30% is spent on security, 15% is spent on mismanagement, corruptoin and fraud, and only 27% is actually spent on direct services and investment.

    • 'Iraq in Transition: Post-Conflict Challenges and Opportunities' (Nov 2004)

      Report by the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation.

    • Reconstructing Iraq (02 Sept 2004)

      Report by the International Crisis Group, outlining the economic problems caused by the Baathist heritage, security problems, lack of CPA planning, and short-termism caused by the hastening of the timetable for the transfer of power. Worries that the limited legitimacy of the interim government will restrain it from making broad economic changes, and sets out an economic agenda for the Iraqi government and the international community. Full report available in pdf and MS Word formats, and in Arabic

    • Baghdad Year Zero (Sept 2004)

      Naomi Klein links the failures in reconstruction of Iraq to US corporate interests and laissez-faire economic policy.

    • Progress or Peril: Measuring Iraq's Reconstructoin (Sept 2004)

      Analysis undertaken by the Post Conflict Reconstruction Project. Looks at the difficulties of measuring progress when sources are unreliable and data is hard to obtain, noting the fact that US and the international community have not been using the most up-to-date theory on post-conflict reconstruction affectively. Recommends various measures that could be used in the future, with particular reference to including Iraq voices and control of projects. An update published in October 2004 can be found here.

    • Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Iraq (19 May 2004)

      Paper by Almas Heshmati, an academic at the MTT Agrifood Research Finland. Tries to provide a comprehensive picture of the past and current conditions in Iraq, and evaluates proposed development policies

    • Reconstructing Iraq's Economy (2004)

      Bathsheba Crocker, writing in The Washington Quarterly , recounts economic policy in Iraq since 2003, and gives some thoughts on the future.

    • 'Reconstructing Iraq: A Guide to the Issues' (30 May 2003)

      Report by the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation. Also available is an executive summary.

    • Monthly Reconstruction and Development Updates on Iraq since April 2005
    • Auditing and financial transparency
    • International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq

      Organisation setup by the UN and World Bank, designed to organise and co-ordinate donations to the reconstruction of Iraq. In particular, controls thtwo trust funds: the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund.

      • World Bank Iraq Data Sheet (23 Oct 2006)
      • UNDG ITF October Newsletter (Oct 2006)
      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Newsletter (July 2006)
      • Third Sixth-Month Report of the activities of UNDG ITF (11 May 2006)

        This report is in two parts, with part two.pdf) containting cluster level progress reports, and part one.pdf) covering progress as a whole. The report covers July-December 2005, detailing the work of the fund.

      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Progress Report (May 2006)
      • Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (Feb 2006)

        This World Bank report focuses on the cross-cutting issues at the heart of Iraq’s transition, including the immediate challenges of reviving the economy and creating jobs, rebuilding public services responsive to citizens’ needs, and strengthening safety nets to protect the poor and vulnerable. It also addresses some overarching issues in public sector governance, particularly the management of oil revenues, the realignment of economic incentives and prices, the reform of human resource management, and the implementation of anticorruption efforts.

  • Academic Studies
    • Unemployment in Iraq After the War (2005)

      Draft report by Pal Sletten, Fafo Institute Oslo, discussing the context, data and distribution of unemployment in Iraq. Contrasts the massively varying estimates of unemployment in Iraq, and concludes that unemployment is probably lower than a lot ofestimates - and that using the ILO's definitions it is between 10 and 20%. Also notes that it may have decreased since before the invasion, due to the high level of unemployment created by sanctions. However, still notes that this is cause for great concern, and for example care should be taken when reforming the state-owned industries, which employ about half a million people (8% of the working population). Details drawn from paper written by Pal Setten and Louay Rashid, Comparison of Iraq Labour Force Statistics

    • Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Iraq (19 May 2004)

      Paper by Almas Heshmati, an academic at the MTT Agrifood Research Finland. Tries to provide a comprehensive picture of the past and current conditions in Iraq, and evaluates proposed development policies

    • Economic policy and prospects in Iraq (04 May 2004)

      Account of the CPA's attempts at economic reform. Concludes that economic development will come only if Iraq "maintains the pro-market outlook of Coalition policy". Written by four former CPA officials, affiliated with the US treasury, US and UK central banks, and the RAND Corporation. Draft of an article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, (only available to subscribers and through subscribing institutions).

    • Reconstructing Iraq's Economy (2004)

      Bathsheba Crocker, writing in The Washington Quarterly , recounts economic policy in Iraq since 2003, and gives some thoughts on the future.

  • Auditing and financial transparency
  • Corruption and Insurgency Funding
    • Interview with Barham Salih (16 Nov 2006)

      Interview with deputy prime minister in the Financial Times newspaper in which he claims that corruption ‘is fuelling Iraqi conflicts’

    • Article on Intercepting Insurgency Aid (01 Nov 2006)

      Article in the Washington Post newspaper on trying to prevent smuggling and other funding of Iraq insurgency groups on the Syria border

    • Second Transparency Report on Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum (2006)

      This document, produced by the inspector general of Iraq's ministry of oil and translated by Revenue Watch, describes corruption in the oil sector, and particularly the multi-billion dollar smuggling of crude petroleum and refined products.

  • Debt
    • Update on compensation payments for Kuwait (27 Oct 2006)

      Article in the Independent newspaper on Iraq's continuing payments towards Kuwait in compensation for the first gulf war.

    • Iraq returns to financial markets (03 Jan 2006)

      Iraq is to issue $2bn worth of bonds in order to raise money to pay off its remaining debts to various private sector lenders.

    • IMF Approves Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq (23 Dec 2005)

      The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the institution's first-ever Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq, which is designed to support the nation's economic program over the next 15 months. A pdf file containing a report by IMF staff completed endorsing the SBA request, an Appendix containing documents from the Iraqi government in support of their SBA request, a supplemental report by IMF staff indicating that Iraq had enacted the remaining pre-conditions to the SBA, and a statement by Iraq's Executive Director at the IMF is now available. The main elements of the reports are:

      • the SBA allows Iraq to draw on 40% of its IMF quota in the event of a crisis; Iraqi authorities plan not to use this right;

      • the SBA runs until March 2007

      • in return for this facility, Iraq accepts a number of quantitative performance criteria and targets (p. 29, Table 11) centred on fiscal stability as well as a number of qualitative structural performance criteria and benchmarks (p. 31, Table 13) centred on central bank operations, government statistics (including audits thereof) and the development of the banking sector, largely by implementing modern clearing systems between the CBI and commercial banks.

      • approval of the SBA triggers the second 30% reduction of Paris Club debt. The IMF staff still regard Iraqi debt as 'unsustainable'; with the third reduction (to occur if Iraq undergoes three years of programmes like the SBA) it becomes 'sustainable'

      • the document reports on Iraqi economic and governance performance

      None of the ongoing criteria or targets listed above relate directly to petroleum product subsidies. That which seems to bear on this most closely is the floor on revenues from oil related enterprises (Table 11). This would see ID3,250bn (US$2.2bn) raised over 2006, compared to ID900bn (US$600mn) over 2005. To put this in perspective, the 2006 target is a bit less than what the Iraqi government has been spending annually to import refined products.

      In December 2005, as a 'prior action', the Iraqi government did reduce subsidies on a number of petroleum products. The price schedule is displayed in Table 6 (p. 24), which includes an average of prices in the Gulf. These are listed as the IMF staff "urge" Iraq (p. 10, para. 21) to align domestic prices to this average by 2007; the strategy of Iraqi authorities is to further increase prices on a quarterly basis.

      There is almost no discussion about how these prices rises are expected to influence Iraqi society: no information is presented on who currently benefits from the subsidies, in part as this is probably not known - a household income and expenditure survey is only expected to be ready by the end of 2006 (p. 15, para. 39). Thus, steps are mentioned to offset the disruption that will be caused - better control over ration expenses, a 'safety net' equal to one third the savings gained from subsidy reductions targetted at the million poorest households (p. 11, para. 25) - but no further details are provided.

    • Paris Club Iraq Debt Treatment (21 Nov 2004)
    • Jubilee Iraq

      UK-based organisation campaigning for reduction of Iraq's external debts. Their website contains more information resources about Iraq's debt situation.

  • International Organisations
    • 'Iraq in Transition: Post-Conflict Challenges and Opportunities' (Nov 2004)

      Report by the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation.

    • 'Reconstructing Iraq: A Guide to the Issues' (30 May 2003)

      Report by the Open Society Institute and the United Nations Foundation. Also available is an executive summary.

    • IMF
      • First and Second Reviews Under the Stand-By Arrangement (09 Aug 2006)

        The IMF has conducted its 1st and 2nd quarterly reviews of Iraq under the Stand-By Arrangement at the same time due to delays in forming the new government;

        • Iraqi authorities have been largely successful in meeting the SBA targets; when these have not been met, the IMF Executive Board has accepted their requests for waivers (accompanied by a list of corrective measures); the IMF staff have also been favourably impressed by the new government's resolve to continue with the programme. Thus, the SBA is "back on track".

        • economic growth fell to 4% in 2005, and is predicted to continue at that over 2006; inflation has begun to accelerate, a problem worsened by a fixed nominal exchange rate; the fiscal balance is in surplus, in part due to government's inability to undertake investment projects; reserves (oil revenues in the DFI and dollars held by the CBI) are high.

        • the new government is holding the line on spending outside the 2006 budget: there will not be a supplemental budget. Wages and pensions are felt to provide the greatest risk to fiscal balance. The IMF has therefore stressed the omportance of reforming the new pensions law before it takes effect, and claims that the GoI plans to do so (with the World Bank) before the end of September.

        • domestic refined fuel prices have again been increased, bringing them ahead of the SBA schedule in some cases.

        • a draft law to allow private imports of refined products has been passed following removal of clauses setting price controls on resale of the products. It is hoped that this will ease the fuel crisis, and bring black market prices down towards international levels.

        • the Ministry of Finance will resume its bi-weekly T-bill auctions although it already has large reserves

        • to address inflation, the CBI has been raising interest rates. As the monetary transmission mechanism is weak, it is unclear that this does much other than signal the CBI's concern.

        In conclusion, "Iraq's medium term economic prospects look reasonably favorable, but are subject to considerable risk".

      • IMF Approves Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq (23 Dec 2005)

        The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the institution's first-ever Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq, which is designed to support the nation's economic program over the next 15 months. A pdf file containing a report by IMF staff completed endorsing the SBA request, an Appendix containing documents from the Iraqi government in support of their SBA request, a supplemental report by IMF staff indicating that Iraq had enacted the remaining pre-conditions to the SBA, and a statement by Iraq's Executive Director at the IMF is now available. The main elements of the reports are:

        • the SBA allows Iraq to draw on 40% of its IMF quota in the event of a crisis; Iraqi authorities plan not to use this right;

        • the SBA runs until March 2007

        • in return for this facility, Iraq accepts a number of quantitative performance criteria and targets (p. 29, Table 11) centred on fiscal stability as well as a number of qualitative structural performance criteria and benchmarks (p. 31, Table 13) centred on central bank operations, government statistics (including audits thereof) and the development of the banking sector, largely by implementing modern clearing systems between the CBI and commercial banks.

        • approval of the SBA triggers the second 30% reduction of Paris Club debt. The IMF staff still regard Iraqi debt as 'unsustainable'; with the third reduction (to occur if Iraq undergoes three years of programmes like the SBA) it becomes 'sustainable'

        • the document reports on Iraqi economic and governance performance

        None of the ongoing criteria or targets listed above relate directly to petroleum product subsidies. That which seems to bear on this most closely is the floor on revenues from oil related enterprises (Table 11). This would see ID3,250bn (US$2.2bn) raised over 2006, compared to ID900bn (US$600mn) over 2005. To put this in perspective, the 2006 target is a bit less than what the Iraqi government has been spending annually to import refined products.

        In December 2005, as a 'prior action', the Iraqi government did reduce subsidies on a number of petroleum products. The price schedule is displayed in Table 6 (p. 24), which includes an average of prices in the Gulf. These are listed as the IMF staff "urge" Iraq (p. 10, para. 21) to align domestic prices to this average by 2007; the strategy of Iraqi authorities is to further increase prices on a quarterly basis.

        There is almost no discussion about how these prices rises are expected to influence Iraqi society: no information is presented on who currently benefits from the subsidies, in part as this is probably not known - a household income and expenditure survey is only expected to be ready by the end of 2006 (p. 15, para. 39). Thus, steps are mentioned to offset the disruption that will be caused - better control over ration expenses, a 'safety net' equal to one third the savings gained from subsidy reductions targetted at the million poorest households (p. 11, para. 25) - but no further details are provided.

      • 2005 Article IV Consultation (Aug 2005)

        Annual IMF report, including data on oil production, inflation, assesment of Millenium Development Goals progress. Notes a lack of macroeconomic data and urges the Iraqi government to reduce Petrol subsidies. There is also a statistical appendix

      • Considerations on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations for the Constituent Assembly (Apr 2005)

        Working paper considering inter-departmental relationships and goverment reform.

      • Use of Fund Resources—Request for Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (Sept 2004)

        IMF Country Report No. 04/325

    • International Crisis Group
      • Reconstructing Iraq (02 Sept 2004)

        Report by the International Crisis Group, outlining the economic problems caused by the Baathist heritage, security problems, lack of CPA planning, and short-termism caused by the hastening of the timetable for the transfer of power. Worries that the limited legitimacy of the interim government will restrain it from making broad economic changes, and sets out an economic agenda for the Iraqi government and the international community. Full report available in pdf and MS Word formats, and in Arabic

    • International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq

      Organisation setup by the UN and World Bank, designed to organise and co-ordinate donations to the reconstruction of Iraq. In particular, controls thtwo trust funds: the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund, and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund.

      • World Bank Iraq Data Sheet (23 Oct 2006)
      • UNDG ITF October Newsletter (Oct 2006)
      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Newsletter (July 2006)
      • Third Sixth-Month Report of the activities of UNDG ITF (11 May 2006)

        This report is in two parts, with part two.pdf) containting cluster level progress reports, and part one.pdf) covering progress as a whole. The report covers July-December 2005, detailing the work of the fund.

      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Progress Report (May 2006)
      • Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (Feb 2006)

        This World Bank report focuses on the cross-cutting issues at the heart of Iraq’s transition, including the immediate challenges of reviving the economy and creating jobs, rebuilding public services responsive to citizens’ needs, and strengthening safety nets to protect the poor and vulnerable. It also addresses some overarching issues in public sector governance, particularly the management of oil revenues, the realignment of economic incentives and prices, the reform of human resource management, and the implementation of anticorruption efforts.

    • UN
      • UNDP Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004 (12 May 2005)

        The UNDP carried out a survey in 2004 to analyse the living conditions in Iraq. This found that "Iraq [is] now suffering from some of the region’s highest rates of joblessness and child malnutrition and continuing severe deficiencies in sewage systems, electric power supplies and other essential public services"

        Key findings also include:

        • Unemployment among young men with secondary or higher education stands at 37 percent
        • Even though most Iraqis are now connected to water, electricity or sewage networks, supplies remain unstable and unreliable
        • Almost a quarter of children between the ages of six months and five years suffer from malnutrition
        • More young people today are illiterate than in previous generations
        • Just 83 percent of boys and 79 percent of girls of school age are enrolled in primary school.

        See also the UNDP press release.

        The questionnaire used for the survey is available from FAFO

      • UNAMI Reconstruction and Development updates

        Index of monthly updates since April 2005 produced by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq.

      • Unicef Country Program Document (26 Oct 2006)

        Details of the situation of children in Iraq and the Unicef's work there

      • Early Childhood Development In Iraq (20 Oct 2006)

        Report on the problems and progress with early childhood development in Iraq

      • UN Reconstruction and Development Update (Apr 2006)
      • Second Sixth-Month Report of the activities of UNDG ITF (30 Nov 2005)

        This report is in two parts, with part two containting cluster level progress reports, and part one covering progress as a whole. The report covers Jan-July 2005, detailing the work of the fund. It concludes by noting that though project implimentation is speeding up, extra funds will be needed.

      • United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (Oct 2003)
    • World Bank
      • World Bank Iraq Data Sheet (23 Oct 2006)
      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Newsletter (July 2006)
      • World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Progress Report (May 2006)
      • Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (Feb 2006)

        This World Bank report focuses on the cross-cutting issues at the heart of Iraq’s transition, including the immediate challenges of reviving the economy and creating jobs, rebuilding public services responsive to citizens’ needs, and strengthening safety nets to protect the poor and vulnerable. It also addresses some overarching issues in public sector governance, particularly the management of oil revenues, the realignment of economic incentives and prices, the reform of human resource management, and the implementation of anticorruption efforts.

      • World Bank Approves First IDA Credit (29 Nov 2005)

        Press release detailing the first IDA loan (International Devlopment Association loan, given at below market rates) to Iraq for 30 years. The $100 million 'Third Emergency Education Project' (TEEP) is aimed to help the Government of Iraq alleviate school overcrowding and lay the groundwork for educational reform.

      • Second Interim Strategy Note (23 Aug 2005)

        Overall report outlining how the WB sees the situation in Iraq, what it has done there so far, and plans for the financial year 2006-2007 (for which growth is predicted to be 17%).

      • Pensions In Iraq: Issues, General Guidelines for Reform and Potential Fiscal Implications (Aug 2005)

        World Bank policy note

      • Iraq Trust Fund Data Sheet (July 2005)

        Spreadsheet detailing donors to and projects funded by the WB Iraq Trstu Fund. Also contains basic GDP, growth, etc. statistics.

      • Rebuilding Iraq: Economic Reform and Transition (July 2005)

        Executive Summary of a report focusing on the main issues of Iraq’s transition . Lays out policy options available to the Iraqi government, and discussing tradeoffs under each option. The key themes are reconstruction and job creation; reform of the pricing system; managing oil revenues; and strengthening safety nets.

        In particular, notes "In 2004, only 15 percent of households had a stable electricity supply, and a mere 20 percent had safe and stable drinking water. ". Also focuses on the need to create a better environment for private job creation, trade policy, pricing systems and public governance.

      • Considering the Future of the Iraqi Public Distribution System (28 June 2005)

        Looks at the function of the PDS in the post-sanctions-era. Considers three options: a rapid elimination of the PDS; replacement of the PDS with universal cash transfers (available to all Iraqis); and replacement of the PDS with means-tested cash transfers. It recommends a four-part program including (i) gradually introducing targeting, (ii) reducing the number of products in the ration basket, (iii) increasing the role and capacity of the private sector in the PDS, and in food markets in general, and (iv) immediate improvements in procurement and financial management.

      • The World Bank In Iraq: Iraqi Ownership for Sustainability (June 2005)

        Working paper looking at how the bank should go about reconstruction porjects and institution building in Iraq, looking at previous World Bank work and the background of Iraq.

      • World Bank: Iraq Interim Strategy Document (Jan 2004)
      • United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (Oct 2003)
    • WTO
  • Iraqi Institutions
    • Iraq's trade unions: Tender shoots in weed-bound soil (04 May 2006)

      'The Economist' article on the plight of Iraqis trade unions, who have been targeted by insurgents and the government

    • The Iraqi Constitution from an Economic Perspective (26 Aug 2005)

      link to an interview with Noah Feldman on the 1st of August 2005

    • Iraq Development Strategy: 2005-2007 (30 June 2005)

      Produced by the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. Comprehensive look at government strategy at the micro and macro level, including a focus on how to devolve responsibilities to the regional level.

    • Interview with Iraq's Minister of Agriculture (16 Dec 2004)

      Interview of Sawsan Ali Magid al-Sharifi by the UNOCHA's Integrated Regional Information Networks, looking at how the government can boost agricultural production. Details problems with continuing subsidies and the Public Distribution System

    • Central Bank Of Iraq

      Includes financial statistics in Arabic and English, as well as banking laws and monetry policy.

    • Iraq Development Program

      Initiative to promote economic development of Iraq, in particular to help Iraqi businesses, partly through organising summits and partnerships.

    • Iraq Stock Exchange Data

      News, quotes, charts and analysis for the Iraq Stock Exchange, which began trading in the summer of 2004.

    • Ministry of Industry and Minerals
    • Ministry of Trade

      Rather inactive website of the MoT. Includes a directory of businesses

    • Ministry of Water Resources
    • Trade Bank Of Iraq

      National Trading Bank lending to government departnments and state enterprises. Funded by various international banks.

    • International Compact with Iraq

      A plan for the economic redevelopment of Iraq, arranged by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the UN, along with the Government of Iraq. The Compact aims to achieve "Iraq’s economic transformation and integration into the regional and global economy" through a five-year development plan

      • ICI outline (draft) (05 Sept 2006)

        Early draft of a document outlining the role and nature of the International Compact. This is intended to be completed in November 2006. Currently it states a vision for Iraq as "A secure, unified, federal and democratic nation, founded on the principles of freedom and equality, and providing peace and prosperity for its people". At present, the document cosists mainly of a jumble of Powerpoint slides

    • Iraqi American Chamber of Commerce and Industry

      Established by several hundred IraqiAmerican business professionals with the aim to help the iraqi private sector join the global economy of the 21st century after decades of neglect. Today IACCI has over 150 employees - mostly Iraqis in offices throughout Iraq, Amman (Jordan) and Washington DC.

    • Oil
    • Pre-Invasion Economy
      • Iraq's economy: past, present, future (03 June 2003)

        Report prepared for the US Senate committee on foreign relations by Jonathan E. Sanford. Although this version dates to 2003, the report claims it "will be updated periodically".

      • Sanctions

        Economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq by the United Nations Security Council in 1990. They were lifted after the US-led invasion in 2003. The CASI website (Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq/Cambridge Solidarity with Iraq) has lots of information and links.

      • US & UK Government
        • Iraq Reconstruction: Without Additional Funding, Progress Likely to Fall Short, Weakening War Effort (27 Feb 2006)

          Report from the Centre for Strategic and Budgetry Assesments, detailing the need for between $18bn-$28bn more needed to complete the reconstruction of Iraq, an amount far greater than the $2.2bn the US has pledged.

        • The Bush Administration Record: The Reconstruction of Iraq (18 Oct 2005)

          Report prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman by the Committee On Government Reform, Minority Office. States "Billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent, but there is little to show for the expenditures in Iraq", concluding there are two major causes of this - the lack of security, and the flawed contracting systems used. Also notes massive over-charging by Haliburton for work on the Oil Sector, an inability of the Iraqi ministries to maintain projects started by USAID due to inadequate training, and a complete lack of improvement on providing drinkable water to Iraqis.

        • US GAO Testimony: 'Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results And Mantaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress' (18 Oct 2005)

          Report by the US Government Accountability Office investigating US progress in rebuilding Iraq. Notes the difficulting in maintaining infrastructure projects, and the difficulty of measuring progress. Recommends that Iraq will probably need signifcantly more than the $56bn estimated previously by the World Bank, due to unforseen looting, sabotage and lower than expected oil revenues. Finds that data collected is incomplete, citing for example that the Department of State reports on number of water projects completed, but not on the condition of the water supply to Iraqi people. A summary can be found here.

        • Iraq's economy: past, present, future (03 June 2003)

          Report prepared for the US Senate committee on foreign relations by Jonathan E. Sanford. Although this version dates to 2003, the report claims it "will be updated periodically".

        • Department of Commerce Iraq Portal

          Site providing documents and links relevant to doing business in Iraq, including the legal environment and financing situation.

        • Energy Information Administration Iraq Page

          Data and Forecasts on Iraq Oil Production and prices provided by the US governments energy statistics body, as well as background on Iraq's production capacity and history.

        • Department for International Development
          • Development Assistance in Iraq: Interim Report (Jan 2005)

            Report presented to the House of Commons International Development Committe. Notes the difficulties of the conditions that DfID are working in, and hence the lack of analysis from NGOs and government agencies that it would normally expect. Oral evidence includes statements by Jim Drummond, head of DfID's Iraq Directorate, Mr Michael Anderson, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department, andMrDavid Hallam, Iraq Senior Programme Manager, Department for International Development,

            Mr Quentin Davies: "it is quite clear to me that a lot of the money being spent by DFID is quite inconsistent with the principles in the 1998 Act of Parliament which governs your existence which says that you can only spend money on poverty reduction because a lot of the money is being spent, and I think very sensibly spent, on capacity building, that is to say, advice, consultancy to the Iraqi administration. The Adam Smith Institute, for example, has a contract from DFID to help restructure some of the Iraqi ministries, in fact physically restructure them, even suggesting how the minister’s office should be laid out, I discovered, but most importantly, of course, what kind of tasks, what kind of functions, what kind of capabilities were required and giving advice on decision-making procedures and so forth, but it is not poverty reduction except by an extraordinary leap of the the imagination."

            "DFID has also developed a “National Programme” primarily to provide advice to the new IIG on core central government functions. DFID has a £3 million programme to assist the IIG in the design and implementation of essential economic reform programmes, which will also help Iraqin its negotiations for a debt-reduction package. DFID has also provided over £3 million towards an IMF technical assistance package for Iraq. This support has provided training for Iraqi oYcials in a wide range of public financial management areas."

          • Iraq Country Assistance Plan (19 Feb 2004)

            20-page document laying out the DFID's plan for assistance to Iraq until March 2005. Also includes a useful summary of social and economic conditions in early 2003. According to the plan, most British aid for humanitarian and relief projects is channeled through the ICRC and other NGOs. The DFID retains for itself direct control of governance and society-building projects, where it foresees an activist role for itself. DFID priorities will include improving government statistics and transparency, consolidating the budget process, encouraging government action to protect the poor and vulnerable, and changing the government role from that of command and control to that of 'regulator and facilitator within a market-based system'. An Arabic version is also available.

          • Iraq Updates

            Summaries (in PDF format) of DFID's work in Iraq. Generally upbeat, with photos and human interest stories showing the successes of DFID projects in Iraq. They seem to be produced monthly now, although in the past they have appeared more frequently. The most recent update can always be found here.

          • Procurement contracts for Iraq

            Lists of contracts let by DfID's procurement department in the last two calendar years. For example, in November 2005 a contract for £349,538 was let to Adam Smith International Ltd for 'Economic Reform Programme II'.

          • Government Accountability Office
            • GAO report on key 'benchmarks' for Iraqi government Sep 2007 (04 Sept 2007)

              Public Law 110-28 contains 18 benchmarks for the Government of Iraq to meet by 1 September 2007. As of 30 August 2007, the GAO assessed that the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks.

              Benchmarks met:

              • the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected.
              • Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan
              • almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad have been established

              Benchmarks partially met:

              • Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions (law passed but not yet implemented)
              • Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.
              • eliminating safe havens for "outlaws"
              • Equitable allocation and spending of $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects and essential services
            • Overview of GAO Findings and Methodology on Iraq (18 Jan 2007)

              This brief document summarises a number of key GAO reports on Iraq since 2003. Also interestingly states that the GAO plans to establish a presence in Iraq from March 2007 (subject to Congress granting them the money).

            • GAO Testimony: Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Financing Challenges (08 Feb 2006)

              "Iraq will likely need more than the $56 billion that the World Bank, United Nations, and CPA estimated it would require for reconstruction and stabilization efforts from 2004 to 2007."

              "However, it is unclear how Iraq will finance these additional requirements....Iraq's ability to financially contribute to its own rebuilding and stabilization efforts will depend on the new government's efforts to increase revenues obtained from crude oil exports, reduce energy and food subsidies, control government operating expenses, provide for a growing security force, and repay $84 billion in external debt and war reparations." Summary is here

            • US GAO Testimony: 'Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results And Mantaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress' (18 Oct 2005)

              Report by the US Government Accountability Office investigating US progress in rebuilding Iraq. Notes the difficulting in maintaining infrastructure projects, and the difficulty of measuring progress. Recommends that Iraq will probably need signifcantly more than the $56bn estimated previously by the World Bank, due to unforseen looting, sabotage and lower than expected oil revenues. Finds that data collected is incomplete, citing for example that the Department of State reports on number of water projects completed, but not on the condition of the water supply to Iraqi people. A summary can be found here.

            • Rebuilding Iraq (28 June 2004)

              Substantial report to Congress, covering funds allocated and progress achieved in four main areas of resources, security, governance and essential services, along with commentary on oversight issues.

            • GAO documents on Iraq

              Listing of all Iraq-related documents produced by the General Accounting Office

          • Program Management Office

            Managed the $18.4 billion appropriated by the US Congress to support the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, that is almost all of the reconstruction which is run by the US.

            • State Department
            • The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

              (formerly the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of the Inspector General). In charge of auditing and overseeing US reconstruction work, in particular "focused on providing value to the Administration, the Congress, and the American people".

            • USAID Iraq Page

              Details of USA International Development led reconstruction/development programs

              • USAID Iraq Strategy Plan (March 2006)

                Document detailing USAID's vision for the next two years in terms of the development of Iraq.