Auditing and financial transparency
- Corporate carve-up: the role of UK corporations in Iraq (13 March 2006)
Listing of UK companies working in Iraq for Iraqi ministries, and under international reconstruction bodies. Between March 2003 and March 2006, this report finds £1.1bn paid to UK companies for work in Iraq, and estimates that the true figure is significantly higher. This includes £250m paid to Aegis for coordinating security operations, and $500 to Amec to rebuild electricity and water systems.
- Washington Times - 'In search of re-building billions' (20 Jan 2006)
Reports on a 'confidential report' by Iraq's Supreme Board of Audit into alleged corruption and financial incompetence in Iraq's Defence Ministry, obtained by the Washington Times.
The audit reportedly accuses commanders of pocketing their soldiers' wages; US officials and soliders siphoning off money for Cadillacs and airline tickets; and the ministry of defence paying middle-men and arms dealers in advance of contracts that never materialised.
Much of the lost money reportedly came from the $37 billion amassed from Iraqi oil proceeds under sanctions, handed over by the UN to the Coalition Provisional Authority's development fund under Security Council Resolution 1483.
"Mr. Shabot and American officials say they think most of the money in question was stolen in 2003, when the CPA exercised few safeguards, and in 2004, when Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi ruled Iraq without the benefit of financial oversight laws that later became part of the new constitution in 2005."
- File on Four: Iraq reconstruction funds missing (02 Feb 2004)
Excellent investigation into financial mismanagement in Iraq. Covers failures of the CPA's accounting mechanisms, which has been heavily criticised by the auditors and by NGOs, the exclusion of the Governing Council from financial accounting, the awarding of contracts without competition or monitoring, allegations of corruption within Halliburton and in security firm Custer Battles, and attempts within the US government and legal system to identify corruption. A transcript is available [here] (http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/080205_fileonfouriraq.pdf)
- International Advisory and Monitoring Board
Body empowered under UNSC Resolution 1483 to audit the Development Fund for Iraq. Although resolution 1483 was passed in May 2003, the IAMB was not created until October 2004, and did not begin effective work until 2004. It was particularly slow to find Iraqi observers.
- Audit reports
Reports from audits, many conducted by KPMG on behalf of the IAMB. Reports currently available cover January 2004-December 2006.
- IAMB Press Release Statement (04 Nov 2005)
Concerns reciept of the audit reports for spending of the Development Fund for Iraq for June-December 2004. Also notes the results of the Special Audit concerning the award of a non-competitive contract to Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, inc. (a part of Halliburton). In particular, "the IAMB recommends that the U.S. Government seek resolution with the Iraqi Government concerning the use of resources of the DFI which might be in contradiction with the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and recommends that amounts disbursed to contractors that cannot be supported as fair be reimbursed expeditiously", with particular reference to $208million that was not sufficiently accounted for by Halliburton.
- Award Fee Process for Contracts involved in Iraq Reconstruction (25 Oct 2005)
Report looking at the value of the system of offering contracts financial awards for successful work in certain areas. Finds mixed results and recommends a number of measures for improvement.
- Terms of Reference (Oct 2003)
These terms of reference were finally agreed in late October 2003, after a delay of several months. An earlier draft, dated 11 June 2003, shows some differences from the final version. This draft, apparently proposed by the US administration of Iraq, envisaged the CPA appointing the first chair and 5 non-voting members. Unlike the final draft, it does not propose the creation of a secretariat for the IAMB, an omission which would have made it reliant on the CPA for administrative support. Iraq Revenue Watch has a brief commentary and another copy of the draft (same text, but more legible). France and Germany emphasised the importance of founding the IAMB in a set of proposed amendments to a draft UN resolution in September 2003.
- Minutes of meetings
The IAMB also provides a schedule of past and future meetings, and generally issues a press release after each meeting.
- Rules of procedure
These revise an earlier set of rules whcih applied before the transfer of power to the Interim government on 28 June 2004
- Audit reports
- Firms accused of corruption or overcharging
- Halliburton's Performance Under the Restore Iraqi Oil 2 Contract (28 March 2006)
Report from the Minority Office of the Committee on Goverment Reform from Henry Waxman. The summary describes that Haliburton repeatedly and intentionally overcharged, lost control of their costs, were uncooperative and suffered regular delays.
- Ten worst war profiteers of 2004 (Dec 2004)
Report from the Center for Corporate Policy
- Custer Battles
Small security firm. As detailed in a BBC investigation and by CorpWatch, it has been accused of inflating prices by up to $50m. The company hass issued two statements denying these allegations.
- Windfalls of war: US contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan
Detailed information on contracts allocated by the US government
- Halliburton's Performance Under the Restore Iraqi Oil 2 Contract (28 March 2006)
- Iraq Revenue Watch
Small NGO monitoring the use of Iraqi oil revenues. Part of the Open Society Institute, funded by George Soros.
- Geographical Distribution of Iraq's Oil Fields and Its Relation with the New Constitution (May 2006)
- Managing Iraq's Petroleum (Apr 2006)
Report by Iraq Revenue Watch on a meeting of oil experts looking at the future of managing oil revenues in Iraq
- Second Transparency Report on Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum (2006)
This document, produced by the inspector general of Iraq's ministry of oil and translated by Revenue Watch, describes corruption in the oil sector, and particularly the multi-billion dollar smuggling of crude petroleum and refined products.
- 'Iraqi Oil Wealth: Issues of Government and Development' - Policy Recommendations from Discussions at the London Conference (July 2005)
The group's policy recommendations focus on how to promote economic reconstruction, transparency and accountability, equitable revenue distribution, and how to prevent corruption. Most importantly, they urge Iraqis to create an environment in which political, economic, and social actors can participate in developing an oil industry that will support Iraq's transition to democracy.
- 'Protecting the Future: Constitutional Safeguards for Iraq's Oil Revenues' (26 May 2005)
Explores ways that Iraq can avoid this trap by embedding measures for accountability into the future Iraqi constitution. The report recommends provisions that make clear which agencies are responsible for the development and implementation of the Iraqi budget, and grant oversight of oil revenues to all branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial.
- 'Disorder, Negligence and Mismanagement: How the CPA handled Iraq reconstruction funds' (Sept 2004)
Iraq Revenue Watch report on alleged failings in CPA management of Iraq reconstruction funds. The report is available as a pdf file.
- Archive of IRW reports
- Program Management Office
Managed the $18.4 billion appropriated by the US Congress to support the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, that is almost all of the reconstruction which is run by the US.
- The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(formerly the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of the Inspector General). In charge of auditing and overseeing US reconstruction work, in particular "focused on providing value to the Administration, the Congress, and the American people".
- Latest SIGIR Audit Reports (29 Oct 2006)
Latest auditing of Report various programs in Iraq, including in October the Provincial Reconstruction Team, Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities , Management of the Iraqi Interim Government Fund andand Interim Audit Report on Inappropriate Use of Proprietary Data Markings by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contractor, as well as a Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts.
A New York Times summary of the latter can be found here
- Latest SIGIR Testimonies (28 Sept 2006)
Testimonies to the United States House Committee on Government Reform Oversight Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security on reconstruction contracting in Iraq, a review of reconstruction in Iraq to the House Committee on International Relations and a testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction. Also included is a reconstruction fact sheet.
In particular, notes the striking fall in the perfomance of Iraqi utilities since the pre-war period, despite massive US investment, with virtually all indicators being lower than before the fall of Saddam. A summary can be found in the New York Times, while more information can be found in the SIGIR section.
- January SIGIR Audit Reports (26 Jan 2006)
On the 26th January, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released a report entitled The Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects. Just prior to this, on the 23rd January, four others were released, including reports on the Rapid Regional Response Programs in South-Central Iraq, the transfer of IRRF funded assests to the Iraqi government, the managemnet of the Commaders Response Program, and the Mansuria Electrical Reconstuction Project
The report on the IRRF projects looks at the scope and effect of the 'reconstruction gap' - the difference between the number of projects that the US originally proposed to build, and the total built. Findings included that only 49 out of a proposed 136 projects in the water and sanitation. The main explanation was a massive increase in security costs (a reallocation of $5.6bn from the original $18.4bn). A summary can be found in the New York Times
The investigation into the management by the CPA of the Rapid Regional Response Programs, total value about $88million, discovers a massive amount of overcharging, manipulation to avoid review, unauthorised payments, and a severe lack of appropriate acounting and documentation. The report recommends that money wasted through over-payments should be recovered. It also containst stories of millions of reconstruction dollars stuffed casually into footlockers and filing cabinets, an American soldier in the Philippines who gambled away cash belonging to Iraq, and three Iraqis who plunged to their deaths in a rebuilt hospital elevator that had been improperly certified as safe. Moreover, it reports that there were no detailed, overt preparations for the reconstruction of Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 invasion "to avoid the impression that the US government had already decided on [military] intervention". A brief review can be found in the New York Times
The report on the asset transfers looks at the transfer of the projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and managed by the US (namely the Gulf Region Division (GRD) or the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Project Contracting Office (PCO)), to the Iraqi government in 2006-2007. Notes that while procedures for transfer on a local level are fairly well set out, there is a lack of central policy and procedure for transferral of information to the central Iraqi ministires. The report also puts a figure on the 'reconstruction gap'
The Commanders Response Program used $718million for militrary commanders to respond to local urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements. The audit found a lack of co-ordination, and errors in the monitoring of how funds were spent. The Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project reportlooked into an abadoned project to build a power station by USAID and IRRF, with a total estimated cost of about $70million.
- Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funding Programs: Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting (24 Oct 2005)
Report looking at whether IRRF programs are providing comprehensive cost-to-complete estimates, essential for sustainability. Finds that there have been a number of failings and accurate estimates do not currently exist.
- Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects (24 Oct 2005)
Report looking at the capacity of the Iraqi government to continue IRRF projects after US funding/management expires. Worryingly concludes "there is a growing recognition that the Iraqi Government is not yet prepared to take over the near- or long-term management or funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects.... the amounts budgeted by the Iraqi government do not appear to be sufficient to ensure the near- and long-term sustainment of completed reconstruction projects".
- Latest SIGIR Audit Reports (29 Oct 2006)