The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(formerly the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of the Inspector General). In charge of auditing and overseeing US reconstruction work, in particular "focused on providing value to the Administration, the Congress, and the American people".
- Latest SIGIR Audit Reports (29 Oct 2006)
Latest auditing of Report various programs in Iraq, including in October the Provincial Reconstruction Team, Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities , Management of the Iraqi Interim Government Fund andand Interim Audit Report on Inappropriate Use of Proprietary Data Markings by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contractor, as well as a Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts.
A New York Times summary of the latter can be found here
- Latest SIGIR Testimonies (28 Sept 2006)
Testimonies to the United States House Committee on Government Reform Oversight Hearing on Iraq Reconstruction and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security on reconstruction contracting in Iraq, a review of reconstruction in Iraq to the House Committee on International Relations and a testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Iraq Stabilization and Reconstruction. Also included is a reconstruction fact sheet.
In particular, notes the striking fall in the perfomance of Iraqi utilities since the pre-war period, despite massive US investment, with virtually all indicators being lower than before the fall of Saddam. A summary can be found in the New York Times, while more information can be found in the SIGIR section.
- January SIGIR Audit Reports (26 Jan 2006)
On the 26th January, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released a report entitled The Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects. Just prior to this, on the 23rd January, four others were released, including reports on the Rapid Regional Response Programs in South-Central Iraq, the transfer of IRRF funded assests to the Iraqi government, the managemnet of the Commaders Response Program, and the Mansuria Electrical Reconstuction Project
The report on the IRRF projects looks at the scope and effect of the 'reconstruction gap' - the difference between the number of projects that the US originally proposed to build, and the total built. Findings included that only 49 out of a proposed 136 projects in the water and sanitation. The main explanation was a massive increase in security costs (a reallocation of $5.6bn from the original $18.4bn). A summary can be found in the New York Times
The investigation into the management by the CPA of the Rapid Regional Response Programs, total value about $88million, discovers a massive amount of overcharging, manipulation to avoid review, unauthorised payments, and a severe lack of appropriate acounting and documentation. The report recommends that money wasted through over-payments should be recovered. It also containst stories of millions of reconstruction dollars stuffed casually into footlockers and filing cabinets, an American soldier in the Philippines who gambled away cash belonging to Iraq, and three Iraqis who plunged to their deaths in a rebuilt hospital elevator that had been improperly certified as safe. Moreover, it reports that there were no detailed, overt preparations for the reconstruction of Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 invasion "to avoid the impression that the US government had already decided on [military] intervention". A brief review can be found in the New York Times
The report on the asset transfers looks at the transfer of the projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and managed by the US (namely the Gulf Region Division (GRD) or the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Project Contracting Office (PCO)), to the Iraqi government in 2006-2007. Notes that while procedures for transfer on a local level are fairly well set out, there is a lack of central policy and procedure for transferral of information to the central Iraqi ministires. The report also puts a figure on the 'reconstruction gap'
The Commanders Response Program used $718million for militrary commanders to respond to local urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements. The audit found a lack of co-ordination, and errors in the monitoring of how funds were spent. The Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project reportlooked into an abadoned project to build a power station by USAID and IRRF, with a total estimated cost of about $70million.
- Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funding Programs: Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting (24 Oct 2005)
Report looking at whether IRRF programs are providing comprehensive cost-to-complete estimates, essential for sustainability. Finds that there have been a number of failings and accurate estimates do not currently exist.
- Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects (24 Oct 2005)
Report looking at the capacity of the Iraqi government to continue IRRF projects after US funding/management expires. Worryingly concludes "there is a growing recognition that the Iraqi Government is not yet prepared to take over the near- or long-term management or funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects.... the amounts budgeted by the Iraqi government do not appear to be sufficient to ensure the near- and long-term sustainment of completed reconstruction projects".