US & UK Government

  • Iraq Reconstruction: Without Additional Funding, Progress Likely to Fall Short, Weakening War Effort (27 Feb 2006)

    Report from the Centre for Strategic and Budgetry Assesments, detailing the need for between $18bn-$28bn more needed to complete the reconstruction of Iraq, an amount far greater than the $2.2bn the US has pledged.

  • The Bush Administration Record: The Reconstruction of Iraq (18 Oct 2005)

    Report prepared for Rep. Henry A. Waxman by the Committee On Government Reform, Minority Office. States "Billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent, but there is little to show for the expenditures in Iraq", concluding there are two major causes of this - the lack of security, and the flawed contracting systems used. Also notes massive over-charging by Haliburton for work on the Oil Sector, an inability of the Iraqi ministries to maintain projects started by USAID due to inadequate training, and a complete lack of improvement on providing drinkable water to Iraqis.

  • US GAO Testimony: 'Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results And Mantaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress' (18 Oct 2005)

    Report by the US Government Accountability Office investigating US progress in rebuilding Iraq. Notes the difficulting in maintaining infrastructure projects, and the difficulty of measuring progress. Recommends that Iraq will probably need signifcantly more than the $56bn estimated previously by the World Bank, due to unforseen looting, sabotage and lower than expected oil revenues. Finds that data collected is incomplete, citing for example that the Department of State reports on number of water projects completed, but not on the condition of the water supply to Iraqi people. A summary can be found here.

  • Iraq's economy: past, present, future (03 June 2003)

    Report prepared for the US Senate committee on foreign relations by Jonathan E. Sanford. Although this version dates to 2003, the report claims it "will be updated periodically".

  • Department of Commerce Iraq Portal

    Site providing documents and links relevant to doing business in Iraq, including the legal environment and financing situation.

  • Energy Information Administration Iraq Page

    Data and Forecasts on Iraq Oil Production and prices provided by the US governments energy statistics body, as well as background on Iraq's production capacity and history.

  • Department for International Development
    • Development Assistance in Iraq: Interim Report (Jan 2005)

      Report presented to the House of Commons International Development Committe. Notes the difficulties of the conditions that DfID are working in, and hence the lack of analysis from NGOs and government agencies that it would normally expect. Oral evidence includes statements by Jim Drummond, head of DfID's Iraq Directorate, Mr Michael Anderson, Head, Middle East and North Africa Department, andMrDavid Hallam, Iraq Senior Programme Manager, Department for International Development,

      Mr Quentin Davies: "it is quite clear to me that a lot of the money being spent by DFID is quite inconsistent with the principles in the 1998 Act of Parliament which governs your existence which says that you can only spend money on poverty reduction because a lot of the money is being spent, and I think very sensibly spent, on capacity building, that is to say, advice, consultancy to the Iraqi administration. The Adam Smith Institute, for example, has a contract from DFID to help restructure some of the Iraqi ministries, in fact physically restructure them, even suggesting how the minister’s office should be laid out, I discovered, but most importantly, of course, what kind of tasks, what kind of functions, what kind of capabilities were required and giving advice on decision-making procedures and so forth, but it is not poverty reduction except by an extraordinary leap of the the imagination."

      "DFID has also developed a “National Programme” primarily to provide advice to the new IIG on core central government functions. DFID has a £3 million programme to assist the IIG in the design and implementation of essential economic reform programmes, which will also help Iraqin its negotiations for a debt-reduction package. DFID has also provided over £3 million towards an IMF technical assistance package for Iraq. This support has provided training for Iraqi oYcials in a wide range of public financial management areas."

    • Iraq Country Assistance Plan (19 Feb 2004)

      20-page document laying out the DFID's plan for assistance to Iraq until March 2005. Also includes a useful summary of social and economic conditions in early 2003. According to the plan, most British aid for humanitarian and relief projects is channeled through the ICRC and other NGOs. The DFID retains for itself direct control of governance and society-building projects, where it foresees an activist role for itself. DFID priorities will include improving government statistics and transparency, consolidating the budget process, encouraging government action to protect the poor and vulnerable, and changing the government role from that of command and control to that of 'regulator and facilitator within a market-based system'. An Arabic version is also available.

    • Iraq Updates

      Summaries (in PDF format) of DFID's work in Iraq. Generally upbeat, with photos and human interest stories showing the successes of DFID projects in Iraq. They seem to be produced monthly now, although in the past they have appeared more frequently. The most recent update can always be found here.

    • Procurement contracts for Iraq

      Lists of contracts let by DfID's procurement department in the last two calendar years. For example, in November 2005 a contract for £349,538 was let to Adam Smith International Ltd for 'Economic Reform Programme II'.

    • Government Accountability Office
      • GAO report on key 'benchmarks' for Iraqi government Sep 2007 (04 Sept 2007)

        Public Law 110-28 contains 18 benchmarks for the Government of Iraq to meet by 1 September 2007. As of 30 August 2007, the GAO assessed that the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks.

        Benchmarks met:

        • the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected.
        • Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan
        • almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad have been established

        Benchmarks partially met:

        • Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions (law passed but not yet implemented)
        • Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.
        • eliminating safe havens for "outlaws"
        • Equitable allocation and spending of $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects and essential services
      • Overview of GAO Findings and Methodology on Iraq (18 Jan 2007)

        This brief document summarises a number of key GAO reports on Iraq since 2003. Also interestingly states that the GAO plans to establish a presence in Iraq from March 2007 (subject to Congress granting them the money).

      • GAO Testimony: Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Financing Challenges (08 Feb 2006)

        "Iraq will likely need more than the $56 billion that the World Bank, United Nations, and CPA estimated it would require for reconstruction and stabilization efforts from 2004 to 2007."

        "However, it is unclear how Iraq will finance these additional requirements....Iraq's ability to financially contribute to its own rebuilding and stabilization efforts will depend on the new government's efforts to increase revenues obtained from crude oil exports, reduce energy and food subsidies, control government operating expenses, provide for a growing security force, and repay $84 billion in external debt and war reparations." Summary is here

      • US GAO Testimony: 'Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results And Mantaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress' (18 Oct 2005)

        Report by the US Government Accountability Office investigating US progress in rebuilding Iraq. Notes the difficulting in maintaining infrastructure projects, and the difficulty of measuring progress. Recommends that Iraq will probably need signifcantly more than the $56bn estimated previously by the World Bank, due to unforseen looting, sabotage and lower than expected oil revenues. Finds that data collected is incomplete, citing for example that the Department of State reports on number of water projects completed, but not on the condition of the water supply to Iraqi people. A summary can be found here.

      • Rebuilding Iraq (28 June 2004)

        Substantial report to Congress, covering funds allocated and progress achieved in four main areas of resources, security, governance and essential services, along with commentary on oversight issues.

      • GAO documents on Iraq

        Listing of all Iraq-related documents produced by the General Accounting Office

    • Program Management Office

      Managed the $18.4 billion appropriated by the US Congress to support the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, that is almost all of the reconstruction which is run by the US.

      • State Department
      • The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

        (formerly the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of the Inspector General). In charge of auditing and overseeing US reconstruction work, in particular "focused on providing value to the Administration, the Congress, and the American people".

      • USAID Iraq Page

        Details of USA International Development led reconstruction/development programs

        • USAID Iraq Strategy Plan (March 2006)

          Document detailing USAID's vision for the next two years in terms of the development of Iraq.